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Containing the GMO Genie: Cattle Trespass and the
Rights and Responsibilities of Biotechnology Owners
KATIE BLACK & JAMES WISHART*
Genetically modified organisms (GMOs have caused substantial economic Losses by
contaminating non-GMO crops and threatening the economic self-determination of non-
GMO farmers. After Monsanto v. Schmeiser, biotech IP owners hold most of the rights in
the property "bundle" with respect to bioengineered organisms. This commentary highlights
the disequilibrium between these broad patent rights and the lack of legal responsibility for
harms caused by GMO products. The authors propose that there is a rote for tort law-
specifically the tort of cattle trespass-in fairly allocating risk and responsibility.
The doctrine of cattle trespass reflects a policy of distributive justice, positing that the
unique risks associated with keeping living creatures ought to import liability based on the
owner's creation and control of those risks. We suggest that GM canola and its
bioengineered kin represent the next generation of "livestock," and that biotechnology
companies release their transgenic organisms onto the market in the knowledge that these
organisms may escape and do harm. As such, biotech creators and patent holders are
properly liable when risk ripens into harm.
Les organismes g6n6tiquement modifi~s (OGM] ont provoqu6 des pertes 6conomiques
substantielles en contaminant les cultures qui ne renfermaient pas d'OGM et en pr6sentant une
menace pour L'autod6termination 6conomique des exptoitants agricoles autres que ceux de
OGM. Dans Monsanto c. Schmeiser, les titulaires de Ia propri~t6 intellectuetle se rapportant [a
biotechnoLogie d~tiennent La majorit6 des droits dans [a propri6t6 << collective > '6gard des
organismes de bio-ing6nierie. Ce commentaire met en tumi~re le d6s6quitibre entre ces droits
de brevets 6tendus et le manque de responsabilit6 judiciaire pour Les prejudices caus6s par les
produits de OGM. Les auteurs proposent qu'il existe un r6le pour le droit de La responsabitit6
detictuelte - plus particuli~rement le d6lit civil de I'intrusion de propri~t6 par le b6tail - en
r6partissant 6quitablement les risques et [a responsabilit6.
La doctrine de ['intrusion de propri6t6 par le b6tail reftte une politique de justice
distributive, adoptant le principe que Les risques particuliers associ~s iLa garde de
cr6atures vivantes doit comprendre La responsabitit6 en fonction de La cr6ation et du
contr6le de ces risques par te propri6taire. Nous sugg~rons que le canota 6 OGM, et le fait
qu'il soit apparent6 6 Ia bio-ing6nierie. repr6sentent Ia g6n6ration suivante de << b~tail >, et
que les soci6t6s de biotechnologie mettent leurs organismes transg6niques sur le march6,
* Katie Black (LL.B. 2009) and James Wishart (LL.B. 2009) are students in the Common Law
Program at the Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. They would like to thank Lynda
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en sachant que ces organismes peuvent s'6chapper et causer des d6gfts. A ce titre, les
cr6ateurs de biotechnotogie et les titulaires de brevets sont suffisamment responsabtes
torsque des. risques se transforment en d~gfts.
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ON 13 DECEMBER 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada passed up its first
opportunity to craft a common law approach to the growing problem of genetic
contamination of conventional and organic farm products by genetically
modified organisms (GMOs).' The Court's denial of leave in Hoffman v.
Monsanto Canada Inc.2 ended an application for class certification by a group of
Saskatchewan organic farmers who alleged that the development and
distribution of genetically modified (GM) canola by two of the world's biggest'
biotechnology corporations had tortiously damaged the farmers' ability to grow
and sell organic canola. Nonetheless, the issue of whether biotech companies
may be liable in tort law for damages caused by their transgenic products
remains a live one, since the Hofflman decision is binding only in Saskatchewan
and the plaintiffs' tort claims were rejected only in the context of class
certification. The decision does not shut the door on the right plaintiff, in the
right circumstances, asserting a claim in tort for damages caused by the release
of GMOs into the environment.'
1. Hoffmnan v. Monsanto Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.C.A. No. 347 [QL.] (In this case, there were
multiple plaintiffs, including Larry Hoffmaii, L.B. Hoffman Farms Inc. and Dale Beaudoin,
and multiple defendants, including Monsanto Canada Inc. and Bayer Cropscience Inc.).
2. [2005] 7 W.W.R. 665 (Sask. Q.B.) [Hoffman]; afrd [2007] 283 D.L.R. (4th) 190 (Sask.
C.A.) [Hoffm an CA].
3. For clarity, "genetic modification" and "transgenic" refer exclusively to the direct
modification of DNA using rDNA techniques. See Part I, below.
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Scholars such as Jeremy de Beer and Martin Phillipson have drawn
attention to this debate in these terms:
[T]he most complicated (and controversial) legal challenge is achieving the
appropriate balance between the intellectual property and contractual rights enjoyed by
agricultural biotechnology multinationals on the one hand, and the obligations that the
enjoyment of these rights should entail on the other. In Canada the manufacturers of
GM crop systems possess a significant arsenal of legal rights in relation to their
products. However, they appear to be relatively unburdened by legal obligations.4
This stands in contrast to the positions of Europe and South America, where a
number of countries have established purpose-built liability regimes for the
transgenic contamination of crops.' De Beer argues that the situation in Canada
represents "a trend away from accountability for technological innovation" 6-a
trend that is especially dangerous where the innovations in question are self-
replicating biological organisms that can cause permanent changes to the
environment and the economy. Moreover, as Birgit Milller has theorized, the
rights allocated to biotechnology corporations have come at the expense of
some farmers' economic self-determination.7
In seeking solutions to this disequilibrium of rights and responsibilities,
commentators have suggested applying patent legislation,8 environmental
regulation,9 property law,"0 and tort law, 1 even proposing a novel tort of
4. Martin Phillipson, "Giving Away the Farm? The Rights and Obligations of Biotechnology
Multinationals: Canadian Developments" (2005) 16 K.C.L.J. 362 at 362.
5. See International Court of Environmental Arbitration and Conciliation, "Consultative
Opinion on Liability of Public and Private Actors for Genetic Contamination of Non-GM
Crops" (2005) 7 Envd. L. Rev. 253.
6. Jeremy de Beer, "The Rights and Responsibilities of Biotech Patent Owners" (2007) 40
U.B.C. L. Rev. 343 at 345 [de Beer, "Rights and'Responsibilities"].
7. Birgit Miller, "Infringing and trespassing plants: Patented seeds at dispute in Canada's
courts" (2006) 48 Focaal - Eur. J. Anthropology 83.
8. See Robert Burrell & Stephen Hubicki, "Patent Liability and Genetic Drift," Case Note,
(2005) 7 Envtl. L. Rev. 278.
9 Jodi McNaughton, "GMO Contamination: Are GMOs Pollutants under The Environmental
Management and.Protection Act?" (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 183; Linda Beebe, "In Re StarLink
Corn: The Link Between Genetically Damaged Crops and an Inadequate Regulatory
Framework for Biotechnology" (2004) 28 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 511.
10. Bruce Ziff, "Travels With My Plant: Monsanto v. Schmeiser Revisited" (2005) 2 U. Ottawa
L. & Tech. J. 493.
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biotrespass to allocate GMO-related risks.12 While many of the proposed
solutions have merit, they require a substantial shift in the existing law. We
argue that the doctrine of cattle trespass, which imposes strict liability upon the
owners of trespassing livestock, offers a solid foundation upon which to erect a
framework of duties owed by biotechnology corporations. This doctrine was
put forward by the Hoffman plaintiffs but rejected summarily by the motions
court and left unexamined by the appeal court. 3 It represents a judicial policy
of distributive justice that recognizes the unique risks associated with keeping
living creatures and imposes liability based on the owner's creation, knowledge,
and control of those risks. It can be used to help rebalance intellectual property
(IP) rights with responsibilities-a balance that is' urgently required in the
exploitation of poorly understood or poorly regulated emerging technologies."
. Two roadblocks stand in the way of applying cattle trespass to cases of
transgenic drift. First, genes are significantly different from livestock. Second, it
is not immediately apparent that the owners of biotech IP are analogous to the
owners of farm animals. Why is the GMO farmer not the proper defendant in,
an action to remedy damages caused by transgenic drift? Drawing on the
Supreme Court's characterization of genetic material in Monsanto Canada Inc.
Ix Schmeiser,"5 and on Canada's current regulatory regime for the development
and marketing of novel organisms, we propose that GMOs are analogous to the
cows in cattle trespass actions. We also argue that biotech companies that
release GMOs onto the market are the appropriate defendants because they
exert the greatest control over genetically modified organisms and hold the
most relevant knowledge about the risks inherent to the commercial
exploitation of these organisms.
We begin by placing the problem in context, outlining in Part I the process
of transgenic drift and assessing the risks presented by the uncontrolled
presence of GMOs in the environment. Part II surveys the legal approaches to
gene trespass, concluding that Canadian courts have been reluctant to view
11. Carie-Megan Flood, "Pollen Drift and Potential Causes of Action" (2003) 28 J. Corp. L. 473.
12. Jeremy de Beer, "Biotrespass" (2007) 27 Bull. Sci. Tech. & Soc'y 287 [de Beer, "Biotiespass"].
13. On appeal, neither the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal nor the Supreme Court of Canada
addressed the cattle trespass issue specifically.
14. De Beer, "Rights and Responsibilities," supra note 6; Miller, supra note 7.
15. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 [Schmeiser].
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genetic modifications outside the silo of intellectual property law. In Part III we
distill the tort of cattle trespass to its fundamental principles and then apply
these principles to the dilemma of gene trespass.
I. GMOS AND TRANSGENIC DRIFT
Over the last decade, in what is referred to as the "Second Green Revolution,"
agribusiness has become increasingly characterized by the replacement of conventional
crops with transgenic plants.16 Internationally, there has been a fifty-fold increase in
the global biotech crop area since the commercialization of GM food in the mid-
1990s." For example, herbicide resistant GM canola now comprises 80 per cent of
the total canola crop in western Canada and covers over 1.6 million hectares.'
Transgenic plants differ from conventional crops in the ways they acquire
the genes responsible for their desirable or marketable traits. Conventional
crops acquire characteristics such as increased heartiness or drought resistance
through generations of selective breeding in the field. Conversely, transgenic
crops acquire new traits within a single generation through the insertion of
genes from unrelated species like bacteria into the crop's deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) using recombinant DNA techniques. Over one hundred conventional
crops have been genetically re-engineered to delay ripening; to increase
resistance to pesticides, pathogens, or environmental conditions;19 to produce
pharmaceuticals, antibiotics, and industrial enzymes;2" and so on. Although
there is no consensus on the benefits of GMO farming, many farmers have
16. Philippe Demenet, "Can genetically modified organisms feed the world?" UNESCO Courier
(2001), online: <http://www.unesco.orglcourierl200l'09/ukplanet.htm>. See also
Canadian Biotechnology Secretariat, Canadian Trends in Biotechnology, 2d ed. (March
2007), online: <http:llbioportal.gc.calStatusreportE/Trendsenglish.pdf>.
17. A. Bryan Endres & Peter D. Goldsmith, "Alternative Business Strategies in Weak
Intellectual Property Environments: A Law and Economics Analysis of the Agro-
Biotechnology Firm's Strategic Dilemma" (2007) 14 J. Intell. Prop. L. 237.
18. Canola Council of Canada, "Canola Facts: Why Growers Choose GM Canola" (2005),
online: <http:llwww.canola-council.org/facts-gmo.html>.
19. Health Canada, "Approved Products: Novel Food Decisions," online: <http://www.hc-
sc.gc.calfn-an/gmf-agm/appro/indexe.html>.
20. Gregory N. Mandel, "The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication" (2005) 23
Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 83 at 87; PEW Initiative on Food and Biotechnology, Harvest on the
Horizon: Future Uses ofAgricultural Biotechnology (September 2001) at 19-27, 53-67, online:
<http://www.pewtrusts.org/ourwork_reportdetail.aspx?id=33392>.
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switched from conventionally bred seeds to GM varieties, perhaps induced by
promises of increased profit margins.21
There is, however, substantial scientific agreement that the unconfined
release of GMOs can cause permanent changes to the environment.22 At the
,most basic level, this change occurs when "newly introduced genetic material
[moves] into environments or organisms beyond those- intended" through a
process known as gene drift.23 Gene drift is caused by two mechanisms: seed
dispersion and pollen-mediated gene flow. 24 In the former, seeds from GM
plants are physically dispersed from their intended cultivation sites by
numerous vectors, most notably wind, and "volunteer" themselves in
neighbouring fields. 21 Pollen-mediated gene flow, on the other hand, occurs
when pollen from one plant population fertilizes a related population of plants.
Canola plants, for instance, are open-pollinating; this means that transgenic
and cbnveniional canola plants located sufficiently close to one another will
exchange pollen by movement of wind and insects. 26 The embryos or seeds that
result from this cross-pollination will contain the modified gene or, in the case
of the transgenic Roundup Ready Canola, the GT73 gene. This next
generation of GT73-modified plants can then go on to cross-pollinate with the
remaining non-GM plants in the population until all plants within range carry
the GT73 modification.
On the Canadian prairies, the environmental saturation of GM canola has
reached the point that, according to growers and advocates, it is now virtually
impossible to grow purely conventional or organic canola, and consequently,
21. Canola Council of Canada, supra note 18.
22. See Royal Society of Canada, Elements ofPrecaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of
Food Biotechnology in Canada (Ottawa: RSC, 2001), online:
<http://www.rsc.ca/index.php?page-id= 119>.
23. Mandel, supra note 20 at 90.
24. Wendy Thai, "Transgenic Crops: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws" (2005) 6 Minn. J.L.
Sci. & Tech. 877 at 881. See also Stephanie M. Bernhardt, "High Plains Drifting: Wind-
Blown Seeds and the Intellectual Property Implications of the GMO Revolution" (2005) 4
Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 1.
25. Royal Society of Canada, supra note 22 at 122-24.
26. Norman C. Ellstrand, Honor C. Prentice & James F. Hancock, "Gene Flow and Introgression
from Domesticated Plants into their Wild Relatives" (1999) 30 Ann. Rev. Ecology &
Systematics 539 at 541. See also David S. Bullock & Marion Desquilbet, "The economics of
non-GMO segregation and identity preservation" (2002) 27 Food Pol'y 81 at 94.
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many conventional seed distributors refuse to warrant their products as GMO-
free.27 In response, the federal government has produced a number of reports on
the best ways to mitigate gene drift or "adventitious presence," which it defines
as "the unintended, technically unavoidable presence of genetically engineered
material in an agri-food commodity."28 Such "technically unavoidable" risk of
adventitious presence is the primary focus of this commentary.
A. ECONOMIC IMPACTS OFTRANSGENIC DRIFT
Since the introduction of transgenic products a decade ago, international
markets for them have proven to be volatile, and consumer backlash has been
common. Regulations vary, but the general trend appears to be towards
stringent segregation due to increased consumer demand for GMO-free or at
least GMO-labelled products.29 In Japan, for example, premiums paid to
suppliers of non-transgenic segregated soybeans on the Tokyo Grain Exchange
varied between US$18 and US$39 per ton in 2001."0 Some international and
domestic marketplace standards require agri-food shipments to be virtually
GMO-free.3 1 European Union legislation, for instance, limits imports to less
than 1 per cent GMO content in non-GM agri-food and less than 5 per cent
GMO content in other products.32 Existing regulations require agri-food
27. Soil Association, Seeds of Doubt: North Americanfarnmers'experiences of GM crops by Hugh
Warwick & Gundula Meziani (Bristol, UK: 2002), online: <http://www.soilassociation.org/
Web/SA/saweb.nsf/9f788a2d1 160a9e580256a71002a3d2b/9ce8a24d75d3f65980256c3700
3 1a2d0/$FILE/SeedsOfDoubt.pdf>. See also Royal Society of Canada, supra note 22 at 123.
28. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, "Workshop on Adventitious Presence with emphasis on
events approved in both Canada and its export markets" (4 February 2005), online:
<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/plaveg/bio/avepre/avepre.shtml> [emphasis added].
29. Ontario, Ministry of Agriculture, Exporting Processed Foods Containing GM Ingredients to
Europe by Promar International (Final Report Prepared for Ontario Ministry of Agriculture,
Food & Rural Affairs and Agriculture & Agri-food Canada, 2006), online:
<http://ats.agr.gc.ca/europe/4328-e.pdf> at 15.
30. Bullock & Desquilbet, supra note 26 at 94.
31. Ibid. at 83.
32. EC, Regulation (EC) 1830/2003 of the European Pariaientand of the Council of22 September2003
concerning the traceability andlabeing ofgenetically mod*fied organisms and the traceability offood and
feedproducts produced from genetically modfied organimu and amending Directive 2001/18/EC, [2003]
O.J. L 268/1. This regulation requires labelling of food or feed containing GM genes. See also
European Food Safety Authority, 'The EFSA GMO Risk Assessment" (2008), online:
<http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/1178621706335/es_ locale-1 178620753812 GMO.htm>. See
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imports to be tested upon their arrival in the destination country, and if they
are found to contain prohibited GMOs, the shipment is rejected.33
Contamination can result either from adventitious presence at harvest or
through the subsequent co-mingling of GM and non-GM products during
sorting, storage, or shipment. Where adventitious presence causes the
contamination of non-GM harvests, farmers may find themselves in breach of
their contractual obligations and/or without markets for their goods.
The scale of loss can be enormous. In 1999 and 2000, American farmers lost
access to almost the entire US$200 million EU corn export market due to the
contamination of food corn stocks across the United States by the StarLink gene, a
modification approved for feed corn only." Non-GM farmers, unable to meet
strict regulatory requirements, were forced to sell their produce on the feed market
at a substantial discount.35 Likewise, when StarLink corn, which is also banned in
Japan, was found to be mixed with non-GM corn shipments from the United
States, the result was "trade disruption and considerable political turmoil. ' 36 US
maize exports to Japan reportedly dropped by fifty-two million bushels in 200 1.
The economic harm caused by GMO contamination is not limited to farmers who
grow the organic or conventional analogues of GM crops. In 1999, EU authorities
discovered a small percentage of transgenic pollen in Canadian honey shipments
from western Canada, much of which is produced amongst GM canola fields. The
regulators responded. by banning Canadian honey from the European Union,
seriously damaging a ten million dollar market.38
also Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, "Agri-Food Regional Profile - European Union: Food
Safety Policies" (February 2006), online: <http://ats-sea.agr.gc.ca/europe/4148_e.htm>.
33. Thomas P. Redick & Christina G. Bernstein, "Nuisance Law and the Prevention of 'Genetic
Pollution': Declining a Dinner Date with Damocles" (2000) 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envt. L.
Inst.) 10328 at 10328-29.
34. Richard A. Repp, "Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop
Production and Genetic Drift" (2000) 36 Idaho L. Rev. 585 at 593.
35. Amelia P. Nelson, "Legal Liability in the Wake of StarLink" (2002) 7 Drake J. Agric. L. 241
at 254-55.
36 Bullock & Desquilbet, supra note 26 at 83.
37. Ibid. See also US Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service, Japan: Grain and
FeedAnnual by Shigeru Nozaki, GAIN Report #JA1026 (23 March 2001), online:
<http://www.fas.usda.gov/gainfiles/200103/65680107.pdf>.
38. Stuart Smyth, George G. Khachatourians & Peter W.B. Phillips, "Liabilities and economics
of transgenic crops" (2002) 20 Nature Biotech. 537.
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Organic farmers must adhere to even stricter standards set by various
organic certifiers that require, for instance, three to five years of organic field'
cultivation prior to certification. 39 A single incident of GMO contamination
from pollen drift or seed dispersal can result in immediate loss of certification.
Once revoked, certification may be hard to regain as transgenic seeds can lie
dormant and viable in organic fields for several growing seasons.4" Lost
certification results in lost access to international and domestic organic markets
which offer substantial premiums over conventional or GM products of the
same grade.41 With the steady increase in the cultivation of transgenic crops in
both Canada and the United States, the likelihood of adventitious GMO
presence and co-mixing during grain storage, shipment, and sorting must also
necessarily increase.4" Faced with the inevitable and near-permanent contamination
of their fields with transgenic seeds, with the Sisyphean task of cleaning up GM
canola, and with pressure from the majority of transgenic crop growers, many
organic and conventional farmers have been left with no option but to sign the
license agreements and sow the crops offered by the biotech corporations. 3
II. LEGAL RESPONSES TO TRANSGENIC DRIFT IN CANADA
Case law regarding the control of GMOs in Canada has developed primarily in
the context of patent prosecutions and enforcement. The effect of these
decisions has been to strengthen the patent rights of biotech IP owners while
narrowly interpreting any concomitant obligations with respect to the harms
caused by the release of animate products of biotechnology. Likewise, while
legislation exists to address some of the potential impacts of GMOs on human
health and the environment, it has not been applied to prevent economic harms
39. See Canadian Organic Growers, Gaining Ground: Making a Successful Transition to Organic
Farming (Ottawa: COG, 2005).
40. R.K. Downey, "Risk assessment of outcrossing of transgenic Brassica, with focus on B. Rapa and B.
Napus" (Paper presented to the 10th International Rapeseed Congress, Canberra, Australia, 1999)
cited in Canadian Food Inspection Agency, "Herbicide Resistance Management Issues In Plants
With Novel Traits" (Discussion Paper presented to the CFIA, Plant Biosafety Office, 26 February
2002), online: <http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/plaveg/bio/resist/disdoce.shtml#licper>.
41. Repp, supra note 34 at 594.
42. Royal Society of Canada, supra note 22 at 126.
43. MiJller, supra note 7..
44. See de Beer, "Rights and Responsibilities," supra note 6; Ziff, supra note 10.
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such as those faced by the plaintiffs in Hoffinan. 5 In this section we examine
the dilemma that has arisen from the Court's insistence on viewing
contamination through the lens of patent law and Parliament's unwillingness to
pass regulation for its control.
From Pioneer Hi-Bred Ltd. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) 46 in 1989
to Schmeiser"7 in 2004, the Supreme Court has maintained that transgenic life
forms raise issues that are outside the scope of extant patent legislation and the
authority of the courts. However, despite its numerous statements that the legal
landscape is not prepared for patents on life, the Court has crafted a position
that-although nominally upholding the Canadian common law prohibition
against patenting higher life forms 8-o ffers IP owners a substantial stake in
organisms that contain patented genes. Justice Binnie expressed this position in
his dissent in Harvard College in the following manner:
[C]oncerns [about patented life forms] include the diversity of the gene pool and potential
escape of genetically modified organisms into the environment. These are serious concerns
which serious people would expect Parliament to address. The concerns, however, have
little to do with the patent system. Patents or no patents, genetically engineered organisms
have arrived in our midst. The genie is out of the bottle.
49
In Schmeiser, the GMO genie drifted from the fields of GMO farmers onto
the land of conventional canola grower Percy Schmeiser and pitted IP rights
against classical property rights. Monsanto, as the patent holder of the
RoundUp Ready GT73 gene, sued Schmeiser for infringement when he
collected and replanted seeds containing the patented gene.5" A majority of the
Court found that by virtue of possessing the seeds and plants containing
Monsanto's invention, Schmeiser was guilty of illegal "use" of that invention
under the Patent Act. In effect, this decision granted Monsanto "super-property
right[s]"'" over its IP that extended to the higher life forms in which the IP was
45. See Beebe, supra note 9.
46. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1623 at paras. 4-8, 12-14, afl'g [1987] 3 F.C. 8 (Fed. C.A.).
47. Supranote 15.
48. See e.g. Re: Application ofAbitibi Co. (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81 (Patent Appeal Board).
49. Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 at para. 103
[Harvard College].
50. Schmeiser, supra note 15.
51. De Beer, "Rights and Responsibilities," supra note 6 at 350.
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contained, technically allowing it to lay claim to any adventitiously occurring
glyphosate-resistant canola plant (and its progeny) in any farmer's field. 2 As the
Court bluntly concluded, "the issue is not property rights, but patent
protection. Ownership is no defence to a breach of the Patent Act."53
If it had been heard by the Supreme Court, the Hoffrnan action could have
provided the proper bookend to Schmeiser, since it would have explicitly asked
the Court to balance the property rights granted to Monsanto and Bayer for
their GM canola with obligations to mitigate the negative effects of the exercise
of those rights. In Hoffiman the plaintiff class sought recourse in tort, alleging
that under the various doctrines of negligence, nuisance, trespass, strict liability,
and statutory liability, the biotech corporations had common law obligations to
control the dispersion of their products and to prevent them from doing
economic and environmental damage.
To succeed on an application for class certification, a plaintiff must
establish (among other things) that the pleadings disclose a cause of action.
This is not a trial on the merits. The question for the judge is simply whether,
accepting at face value the facts as pleaded, "there exists a plausible basis in
principle and presumed fact for supposing the defendants could be held
liable.""5 Nevertheless, the motions judge, Justice Smith, found it "plain and
obvious" that none of the traditional common law tort actions could succeed.
Negligence failed for the lack of merit in the allegation that GMO producers
owed a duty either to warn client farmers of the necessity of containment
measures or to ensure that transgenic seed did not spread into neighbouring
non-GM fields.5 6 Strict liability failed because the marketing and cultivation of
GM canola did not meet the threshold for non-natural use as required in
Rylands v. Fleicher."7 The directness requirement for trespass was not met due to
52. Schmeiser, supra note 15 at paras. 107-11. See also Ziff, supra note 10; Jeremy de Beer,
"Reconciling Property Rights in Plants" (2005) 8 J. World IntelU. Prop. 5 [de Beer,
"Reconciling Property"].
53. Schmeiser, ibid. at para. 96.
54. Class Actions Act, S.S. 2001, c. C-12.01, s. 6(a).
55. Hoffman CA, supra note 2 at para. 53.
56. Hoffrnan, supra note 2 at paras. 38, 88.
57. Ibid at paras. 89-97.
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the "intervening cause" represented by Monsanto's client growers." Finally,
although she found some merit in the claim that someone was liable for harms
.caused by the nuisance caused by volunteer canola in organic growers' fields, 9
Justice Smith ultimately rejected the contention that biotech patent holders
were the proper defendants to such an action.
Other authors have dealt in detail with the merits of the Hoffinan decision
with respect to the proposed causes of action.6" For our purposes, it is enough
to observe that Justice Smith, in line with the Supreme Court in Schmeiser,
considered this case within the watertight compartment of IP law, holding that
in situations like this, the law of tort has no purchase on those who hold and
exploit intellectual property. As Justice Binnie commented in Harvard College,
"the genie is out of the bottle,"61 and the Saskatchewan courts in Hoffin'n were
not prepared to use tort law to stuff it back in.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF CATTLE TRESPASS
Of special interest to us is Justice Smith's rejection of the plaintiffs' argument
that gene trespass is analogous to "stray bull cases," or the tort of cattle
trespass.6" She dismissed the argument for these reasons:
The imposition of strict liability for the consequences of stray bulls is clearly a policy
decision intended to place a heavy onus on the owners and possessors of bulls to keep
these animals confined and under control. Although the plaintiff claims that the
defendants "own" their GM canola gene, [it] can point to no similar public policy that
would have, in effect, placed an onus on the defendants not to have commercially
released GM canola, for the plaintiffs' claim is that, once GM canola was commercially
released, cross-pollination of conventional canola crops was natural and inevitable.
63
58. Ibid. at para. 133.
59. Ibid. at paras. 123-24.
60. See e.g. de Beer, "Rights and Responsibilities," supra note 6; Martin Z.P. Olzynski "Hoffman
v. Monsanto Canada Inc.: Looking for a Generous Approach to the Elephant in the Garden,"
(2005) 16 J. Envtl. L. & Prac. 53; and Heather McLeod-Kilmurray, "Hoffinan v. Monsanto:
Courts, Class Actions, and Perceptions of the Problem of GM Drift" (2007) 27 Bull. Sci.
Tech. & Soc'y 188.
61. Harvard College, supra note 49 at para. 103.
62.. The plaintiffs' argument is summarized in Hoffnan, supra note 2 at paras. 129-30.
63. Ibid. at para. 132.
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Put another way, the motions judge asserted that the defendants' broad
ownership rights imported no concomitant legal obligations vis-h-vis those who
might be harmed by genetically modified canola. This effectively allowed
biotech patent holders to tread with impunity upon the classic property
interests of non-GM growers. We believe that the court's interpretation in
Hoffnan stands directly in opposition to the centuries-old principles of
distributive justice embodied in the doctrine of cattle trespass.
A. ELEMENTS AND PRINCIPLES
Beginning shortly after the year 1066, local courts in England awarded
damages to landowners who suffered losses at the hooves and teeth of their
neighbours' animals.", According to Fowler Harper, the rationale was based
on the identification of the possessor with the wrongful conduct of his or her
animal. "'Where my beasts of their own wrong,' says an. anonymous case of the
reign of Henry VII, 'without my will and knowledge break into another's close,
I shall be punished, for I am the trespasser with my beasts.' 6
By 1353 the court of King's Bench had extended the writ of trespass to cover
circumstances where, through no determinable fault by the defendant, his
livestock escaped onto the plaintiff's land. While some may argue that this writ is
outdated, Glanville Williams, painstakingly tracing its history, concludes that
cattle trespass .is "not, as has frequently been thought, a 'stubborn archaism,' but a
perfectly deliberate-although anomalous-extension designed to remedy a gap
in the law."66 Many common law jurisdictions have subsequently codified it,
indicating that the problem remains cogent enough to attract the continued
attention of lawmakers. Manitoba, for instance, imported the tort into statute in
1998 and broadened its scope by imposing joint and several liability on all those
who held property in an offending animal, in order to reflect modern realities of
livestock ownership.6"
64. Glanville L. Williams, Liabilityfor Animals: An Account of the Development and Present Law
of Tortious Liability for Animals and the Duty to Fence, in Great Britain, Northern Ireland and
the Common-law Dominions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939) at 127-28.
65. Fowler V. Harper, "Liability in Anglo-American Law for Damage Done by Chattels" (1938)
2 U.T.L.J. 280 at 284-85 [emphasis added, footnotes omitted].
66. Williams, supra note 64 at 133 [footnotes omitted].
67. Animal Liability Act, C.C.S.M. 1998; see also Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Tort
Liability for Animals (Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1992) at 35 [Manitoba LRC].
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In the frequently-cited case of Cox v. Burbridge, Justice Williams states the
law clearly:
If I am the owner of an animal in which by law the right of property can exist, I am
bound to take care that it does not stray into the land of my neighbor; and I am
liable for any trespass it may commit, and for the ordinary consequences of that
trespass. Whether or not the escape of the animal is due to my negligence, is
altogether immaterial.6 8
This definition was adopted by a Canadian appellate court in Whalley v.
Vandergrand69 and cited as recently as 1988 in Cadman v. Saskatchewan
(Department of Parks and Renewable Resources).7" The doctrine imposes strict
liability on an animal's owner when that animal does damage to the land,
chattels, or person of a neighbour. The animals in question are tame creatures
that are generally considered harmless to humans and are commonly resident
on farms: cows, horses, fowl, sheep, goats, and so on. This category does not
normally include inherently dangerous wild animals or dogs.71 However, the
category is not closed, and an Australian court in Doyle v. Vance stated that
"[t]he Court is at liberty, within reasonable limits, to meet the changed
circumstances of the present day" by subjecting new creatures to the law.72
Thus, in 1988, a Canadian appellate court was prepared to accept the addition
of deer to the list of animals to which the tort applies.73
This category of animal is founded on two principles. First, these animals
were commonly kept for food or profit by landowners. Second, and more
importantly, as Sir Frederick Pollock explained, "it is in the nature of cattle and
other live stock to stray if not kept in, and to do damage if they stray."" The
common law characterizes this "nature" as a matter of common sense, as Chief
Justice Erie expressed in Cox- "[t]he owner of a horse must be taken to know
68. (1863), 13 C.B. (N.S.) 430 at 438; 143 E.R. 171 at 174 [Cox].
69. (1918), [1919] 1 W.W.R. 89 (Sask. C.A.) at 92 [Whally].
70. [1988] 51 D.L.R. (4th) 52 (Sask. Q.B.) [Cadman].
71. See Cowles v. Balac [2004] 135 A.C.W.S. (3d) 49 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). A sui generis legal tradition
based in negligence had been developed for domestic bees, which might otherwise meet the
criteria for cattle trespass. See Harry R. Trusler, "The Law of Bees" (1926-27) 5 N.C. L. Rev. 46.
72. (1880), 6 V.L.R., L. 87 at 92 (trespass by dog).
73. Cadman, supra note 70.
74. Sir Frederick Pollock, The Law of Torts, 13th ed. (London: 1929) at 514, as cited in
Williams, supra note 64 at 127.
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that the animal will stray if not properly secured, and may find its way into his
neighbour's corn or pasture." 5 Furthermore, courts have found that these kinds
of animals, given the opportunity, will by their nature inevitably stray and do
damage if not properly contained. A Canadian court held that an owner "is
presumed to know that if his bull strays into his neighbour's (the plaintiffs)
pasture in which the plaintiff's heifers are, it is in the ordinary course of nature that
the heifers will be impregnated by the bull."76 Other instances of "natural
inevitability" include where one horse kicks and damages another,77 where
trespassing sheep transfer disease to a neighbour's flock,78 and, most commonly,
where livestock trample and eat standing crops.79 This inherent tendency or
inevitability animates the theory of liability underlying the tort of cattle trespass.
With respect to ownership, the rule applies primarily to keepers of
animals-those who exercise possession and control-rather than owners per
se.8 As we will explain below, this distinction has relevance for our argument,
since there are at least two levels of "ownership" pertaining to GM canola seeds,
namely, those of the patent owners and manufacturers and those of the farmer
who grows them. In Cadman, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen's Bench
outlined the possession principle: "before liability in trespass attaches, it must
be shown that the [defendant] has in fact reduced such an animal into its
possession, or, exercised some control over it, such that it can truly be
considered the 'keeper' of the animal."81
Cadman raises a threshold question, since it is not clear from the judgment
what degree of control is necessary to import liability. Glanville Williams
suggests that "[t]he possessor [of animals] is the person who should in fairness
be liable, because it is he who ... can take steps to prevent their escape."8" As a
75. Cox, supra note 68 at 173 [emphasis added].
76. Popowich v. Letweniuk, [1972] 1 W.W.R. 641 (Sask. Dist. Ct.) [emphasis added]; see also
McLean v. Brett, [1919] 49 D.L.R. 162 (Alta. S.C.) [McLean] (plaintiff s heifer serviced by
trespassing bull).
77. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. (1874), L.R. 10 C.P. 10 at 12 [Ellis].
78. Theyer v. Purnell, [1918] 2 K.B. 333 [Theyer].
79. Ackerv. Kerr, [1973] 42 D.L.R. (3d) 514 (Ont. Co. Ct.).
80. Williams, supra note 64 at 176-77. See also Harper, supra note 65 at 282.
81. Cadman, supra note 70.
82. Williams, supra note 64 at 176-77 [emphasis added].
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basic principle, then, liability attaches to one who a) asserts control over the
animal and b) is in the best position to prevent its escape, based upon his or her
knowledge of its instincts and tendencies.
With respect to remediable damages, the common law of cattle trespass is
not settled on what damages will be considered too remote to merit
compensation. One line of cases suggests that compensation will be limited to
"such damage as it is ordinarily in [the animal's] nature to commit... [that is,] the
reasonable and natural consequences of the animal escaping."83 This framework
appears to import a foreseeability test and has at times been used to deny
compensation for personal injuries to plaintiffs when farm animals attack, on the
basis that such damages are too remote.8" However, where damage to farmland,
crops, or chattels is concerned, courts have been more generous. In Theyer,85 for
example, a defendant's diseased sheep trespassed onto a neighbour's property and
infected his herd. Whether or not this precise concatenation of events was
foreseeable, the court found that the end result was not too remote and allowed
the plaintiff neighbour to recover for the reduced value of the diseased sheep.
More significantly, given our present concerns with the potential for genetic
contamination of conventional or organic crops, a well-established line of cases
permits recovery for the loss of value to heifers that have been serviced by non-
purebred bulls. Recovery has also been extended to the reduced value of
genetically inferior calves and even to the lost future fertility of cows.86 Finally, as
in the doctrine of common trespass, the tortious incursion need only be minimal
to meet the threshold, for example, when one horse kicks another through the
bars of a fence." Such a technical trespass usually merits only nominal damages
but has supported claims for injunctive relief.
It should be noted here that, as in the case of common trespass, the plaintiff
class in cattle trespass is apparently limited to the occupiers of land upon which
the offending livestock intrude. This protects against indeterminate liability,
83. Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, vol. 1 at 375-76, as cited in Whalley, supra note 69 at 92.
84. See e.g. Hatton v. Morton, [19211 61 D.L.R. 365 (Alta. S.C.) [Hatton] (plaintiffs own
negligence is responsible for attack by steer).
85. Theyer, supra note 78.
86. Cousins v. Greaves, [19201 54 D.L.R. 650 (Sask. C.A.); McLean, supra note 76 at para. 23
(damages awarded for "loss of a prospective calf which was anticipated as a result of a
breeding intended but wrongfully prevented").
87. Ellis, supra note 77.
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especially in the case of claims for pure economic harm. For instance, a party who
has contracted to purchase wheat which is then eaten by a trespassing horse
would not be able to recover from the owners of the horse.
The final aspect of the tort of cattle trespass which concerns us here is its
imposition of strict liability on the keepers of trespassing animals. A few courts
have struggled with this, purporting to find as evidence a defendant's
negligence or other fault upon which to hang the cloak of liability.8 However,
the majority of cases have demonstrated, as Justice Williams stated in Cox, that
fault remains "immaterial."89 The reasons for this merit examination. At the
core of cattle trespass is the tort of trespass to land, which protects the "sacred
and incommunicable" 90 inviolability of one person's'land against virtually any
intrusion by another. Trespass to land is actionable per 'se and may be
committed by a defendant directly depositing or projecting chattels onto a
plaintiffs land. However, it requires intent, in the sense that a defendant may
trespass if he or she intends to walk through the woods and inadvertently
crosses a plaintiffs land, but will not be liable if, for example, he or she is-or
his or her chattels are-forced onto a plaintiffs land against his or her will.
This exposes what Glanville Williams refers to as a "gap in the law"91 uniquely
with respect to livestock, since animals tend to act of their own instinct in
leaping fences and pillaging cornfields. A defendant might thus be able to avoid
trespass liability by characterizing his or her animals' actions as either indirect
or involuntary. To bridge this gap, the English courts extended the doctrine of
trespass to assign liability to livestock owners without intent or fault.
This special treatment of animals is justified by the principle of distributive
justice: the fair allocation of risk combined with an incentive for livestock
owners to take due care to contain their animals. This principle is seen in the
1704 case of Tenant v. Goldwin:
Every one must so use his own, as not to do damage to another. And as every man is
bound so to look to his cattle, as to keep them out of his neighbour's ground, that so
88. Dobrolowski v. Danyluk, [1921] 2 W.W.R. 729 at para. 14.
89. Cox, supra note 68 at 174.
90. Entick v. Carrington (1765), 19 State Tr. 1029 (C.P.), as cited in Robert M. Solomon, R.W.
Kostal & Mitchell Mclnnes, eds., Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 6th ed.
(Scarborough: Thomson Carswell, 2003) at 123.
91.' Williams, supra note 64 at 133.
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he may receive no damage; so he must keep in the filth of his house of office, that it
may not flow in upon and damnify his neighbour.
92
This is more than simply "do unto others"-it implies that someone who
derives a benefit from creating risk of harm to a neighbour ought to bear that
risk. As reently as 1998, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission summarized
this principle in the following way:
If animals are inherently unpredictable, it seems clear that the person who chooses to
keep an animal has created a risk ... [which] should amount to an assumption of
legal responsibility for the animal's actions ... [T]his assumption of responsibility
includes an acceptance of liability, even when the harm could not be foreseen or
prevented. In this way the costs of the risks posed by animals are borne by those who
gain the benefit of keeping animals.
93
In line with this, keepers of animals are deemed to be in the best position
to control the risks they create. No onus lies upon the neighbour to protect his
or her property "from the depredations of wandering cattle"'9 or other
livestock; the responsibility is entirely the keeper's, who may choose either to
pay up front to contain his or her animals or to pay later to compensate a
plaintiff. This distribution of risks must in the end be seen as a sensible way to
balance property rights in animals with the responsibility to prevent or to
compensate for harm flowing from the exercise of those rights.
Similar considerations inspired the English courts' development of the
doctrine of strict liability for the escape of "mischievous" or dangerous
substances in Rylands v. Fletcher.95 Lord Cranworth, upholding the lower
court judgment, explained that "the question in general is not whether the
Defendant has acted with due care and caution, but whether his acts have
occasioned the damage." 6 Thus, when one, "however innocently," causes
damage to another, it is only just that he or she suffer the consequences-sic
uti suo ut non laedat alienum.97
92.' Ibid. at 134 [footnote omitted].
93. Manitoba LRC, supra note 67 at 35 [emphasis added].
94. Watt v. Drysdale [1907] 6 W.L.R. 234 (Man. C.A.) at 236.
95. A.J. Waite, "Deconstructing the Rule in Rylands v. Fletchei' (2006) 18 J. Envd. L. 423 at 428.
96. Cited in ibid. at 429 [emphasis added, footnotes omitted].
97. Ibid.
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Significantly, neither court suggested that the rule in Rylands should
supersede the tort of cattle trespass. Whereas Rylands is concerned with
dangerous inanimate objects or non-natural uses of land, cattle trespass
addresses commonplace and generally safe animate organisms that sometimes
cause harm. Indeed, courts rarely characterized livestock as dangerous in the
cattle trespass cases, preferring to understand them as naturally destructive in
fairly limited circumstances.98 This distinction is relevant to the tort of cattle
trespass here (as was apparent in the decision in Hoffinan99); though the
characterization of GMOs as dangerous per se may be a difficult proposition for
the courts, the notion that bioengineered organisms can cause particular and
limited kinds of harm is well accepted science.
In conclusion, we believe that the tort of cattle trespass can be distilled to
the following principles:
1) Living chattels, because of their self-willed and self-replicating nature,
and their unique tendency to escape the control of their owners and to
cause harm, require special consideration by the law.
2) Those who exercise control over, and derive a benefit from, living
chattels, which by their nature or instinct have a propensity to escape,
create a risk, and are bound to prevent that risk from ripening into harm.
3) Whenever such organisms do in fact escape and trespass on the property
of another, the keeper should compensate the victim on a strict liability
basis for any ensuing damage to land or other property.
B. APPLYING CATTLE TRESPASS TO GENE DRIFT: ANALOGIZING GENES TO COWS
To demonstrate that cattle trespass offers an appropriate legal remedy for the
damages caused by the adventitious presence Of GMOs, we need to surmount
the two roadblocks identified in the introduction. The first is whether genes
can be considered analogous to cows, and the second is whether biotech
companies can be held liable under this cause of action.
Applying the doctrine of cattle trespass to adventitious presence is
appropriate because patented genes and cells share with domestic livestock the
tendency to escape the control of their owners, to enter neighbouring property,
98. See e.g. Hatton, supra note 84.
99. Hoffnan, supra note 2 at paras. 22, 71, and 97.
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to "impulsively self-propagat[e],""' and to cause consequential harm. In the
same way that the common law recognized these characteristics in livestock, the
Supreme Court-has recognized them in bioengineered organisms.
On the most basic level, bioengineered genes are animate because they are
contained in a plant's pollen and seeds, allowing them to travel and propagate.
When the Court in Schmeiser held that "patented genes and cells are not merely
a 'part' of the plant; rather, the patented genes are present throughout the
genetically modified plant and the patented cells compose its entire physical
structure,"1"1 it accepted-in line with Monsanto's arguments-that genes are
analogous to, or at least inseparable from, animate organisms.. One might object
that the patented modifications to DNA should be viewed in isolation from the
pollen, seeds, and plants in which they are contained. But Monsanto did not
sell, license, or seek to control the use of its bioengineered gene in isolation
from its living hosts. Instead, the company released, marketed, and aggressively
claimed continuing ownership of seeds and plants containing the gene that
were capable of growth, reproduction, cross-pollination, and consequently of
the type of damage complained of by the plaintiffs in Hoffnan. It was to these
living seeds and plants, not just the genetic information contained within them,
that the Supreme Court extended legal protection on Monsanto's behalf in
Schmeiser. Moreover, the Court has noted more than once that genetically modified
organisms might "escape," and that such escapes could have serious consequences.
102
Since 1999, when the Canadian Environmental Protection Act"0 3 (CEPA)
was rewritten to include a section pertaining specifically to "Animate Products
of Biotechnology," federal regulators have also favoured an approach that
understands modified genetic information in the context of its living host
rather than as an IP abstraction. The Act and its accompanying regulations
make creators and importers of genetically modified organisms responsible for
providing the Minister with detailed information about the potential
environmental effects of these genetic differences as they are expressed in a
living organism.' It also recognizes that bioengineered organisms possess
100. De Beer, "Rights and Responsibilities," supra note 6 at 343.
101. Schmeiser, supra note 15 at para. 42.
102. See e.g. Harvard College, supra note 49 at para. 103.
103. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, S.C. 1999, c.33 [CEPA].
104. Ibid., Part 6.
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special characteristics not shared with inanimate substances and thus require
special treatment by the law. The accompanying "Guide to Understanding"
states that "because (bioengineered] organisms are capable of reproduction,"
traditional toxic substances' thresholds and limits are inappropriate."' 5 Likewise,
regulations that add teeth to the Act explicitly advert to the likelihood of
bioengineered organisms escaping the control of their owners both before and
after being released onto the market. For instance, the 2005 New Substance
Notification Regulations (Organisms) require the manufacturer or importer of an
organism to advise the Minister as to the organism's reproductive biology,
including species with which the organism could interbreed in Canada; its
potential for adverse ecological effects, including pathogenicity, toxicity, and
invasiveness; and the likelihood of its escape." 6 These latter requirements show
that Environment Canada recognizes what Saskatchewan organic farmers,
Tennessee corn growers, and the owners of cattle and bulls have known for
some time: that biological organisms, including bioengineered ones, following
their hardwired drive for self-replication and survival, tend to evade the control
of their human keepers and have the potential to do damage.
The natural drive of animals to eat, reproduce, and wander necessitated the
expansion of the law of trespass to accommodate the actions of livestock
independent from their owners. Courts recognized the reality that living creatures
do not respect property lines. As we established earlier, this applies equally to GM
genes, since plant pollen and seeds contain a copy of the parent plant's DNA
(including any inserted genes) and can travel tremendous distances. Like stray
bulls impregnating heifers, GM plants can cross-pollinate with members of the
same or closely related species, transferring their genes and potentially damaging
the commercial value of the recipient organism. Thus, the GM gene can move
from one plant population to another, much in the same way that genetic
characteristics of scrub bulls transfer to the calves of purebred heifers, or even the
way that sheep scab (as in Theyer) may transfer from one flock to another.
The Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee specifically referred to
these similarities between flora and fauna in its survey of the risks and benefits
105. Environment Canada, "Guide to Understanding the Canadian Environmental Protection Act,
1999' (10 December 2004), Part 7 (Animate Products of Biotechnology), online:
<http://www.ec.gc.calCEPARegistry/the-act/guideO4/s7.cfm> ["Guide to Understanding"].
106. New Substances Notification Regulations (Organisms), S.O.R./2005-248.
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of patenting bioengineered organisms. The survey suggested that because plants
and animals can reproduce on their own, regardless of their owners' control or
knowledge, "[i]t is therefore foreseeable that adventitious reproduction of
patented seeds, genetic material and animals will occur."
0 7
Therefore, from a legal, logical, and scientific perspective, very little
distinguishes bioengineered farm plants from farm animals. We suggest that
whatever residual differences exist should not immunize the owners of
transgenic organisms from the application of the principles of distributive
justice that are upheld by the tort of cattle trespass.
C. APPLYING CATTLE TRESPASS TO GENE DRIFT: FINDING THE PROPER DEFENDANT
This leaves us with the difficulty of naming a defendant. The tort of cattle
trespass places liability on the possessor of a malfeasant animal. The possessor
has been characterized as one who has the intent and means to prevent the
organism's escape, as well as the knowledge of the risks associated with keeping
it. This points, in our view, to the biotech companies. In Hofnan, however,
Justice Smith was incredulous of the plaintiff's claim that biotech companies
are the proper target of lawsuits to recover losses caused by trespassing GMOs:
In my respectful view it is not reasonably arguable that ownership of a patent in the
modified gene and enforcement of patent rights through "technology use agreements"
are sufficient to constitute "ownership" or "control" ... after the seed is sold to farmers
and cultivated by them... . The "control" asserted by the technology user agreement is
not control of when and how GM canola is cultivated or harvested, but only control,
or restriction, of the right to save and use seed from the GM crop.
108
For Justice Smith, the risks created by the dissemination of GM seeds
ought to be borne either by the farmers who cultivate them or by those who
suffer harm through their cultivation. Unsurprisingly, the biotech companies
agree. In the aftermath of the Hoffrnan and StarLink controversies, Monsanto
has begun to "educate" its growers on strategies to mitigate pollen drift through
the introduction of the Technology Use Guide (TUG). The TUG explains the
"potential economic impact of the introduction of biotech products on other
107. Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, "Patenting Higher Life Forms and Related
Issues" (June 2002), online: <http://strategis.ic.gc.calepic/site/cbac-cccb.nsf/en/
ah00I88e.html> [footnote omitted].
108. Hoffman, supra note 2 at para. 157.
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[conventional/organic] systems, '"109 acknowledging the possible loss of markets
due to GM contamination of non-GM crops. Despite admitting that the co-
existence of such systems depends on "mutual respect for each system,
Monsanto states that "[t]he responsibility for implementing practices to satisfy
specific marketing standards or certifications lies with that grower who is
growing a crop to satisfy a particular market." ''1 For Monsanto, the non-GM
farmer bears the responsibility to ensure that his or her land remains free from
trespassing GMOs.
The reasoning, of both the Saskatchewan court and the biotech
corporations contradicts the Supreme Court's decision in Schmeiser, the actions
of the biotech corporations themselves, the letter and spirit of environmental
and food safety legislation, and principles of distributive justice that assign
liability to one who creates risks for his or her own benefit. In our analysis,
biotech companies meet the threshold of possession set by cattle trespass
jurisprudence and as such are the proper defendants in cases of transgenic drift.
The Schmeiser case offers compelling reasons why Monsanto and other
GMO patent holders ought to be hoist by their own petard in cases of
transgenic drift. In essence, by interpreting the Patent Act extremely broadly,
the courts granted Monsanto most of the sticks in the proverbial property rights
bundle with respect to transgenic canola seeds and plants containing their
patented gene. The Trial Division concluded that, while "the seed or plant
containing the plaintiffs' patented gene and cell may be owned in a legal sense
by the farmer ... that 'owner's' interest ... is subject to the plaintiffi' patent
right.... Added the Federal Court of Appeal, "the rights of ownership of
property are compromised to the extent required to protect the patent holder's
statutory monopoly." 12
In short, although Percy Schmeiser may have had physical possession of the
GM canola plants he found growing adventitiously on his land, this availed
him nothing since he was precluded from saving, sowing, spraying, selling, or
109. Monsanto, Technology Use Guide (2008) at 7, online:
<http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/ag-products/pdflstewardship/2008tug.pdf>.
1 10. Ibid. [emphasis added].
111. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2001] 104 A.C.W.S. (3d) 567 (Fed. Ct. J.) at para. 91
[emphasis added] lSchmeiser FC].
112. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2002] 218 D.L.R. (4th) 31 (Fed. C.A.) at para. 51.
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sharing the canola. Indeed, as de Beer and Ziff have each shown, the control
given to Monsanto over 'its' transgenic seeds and plants was held to trump even
classic property rights under the doctrine of distrainment and the eons-old
traditional right of farmers to save seeds for future use.
1 3
The holdings of the three courts in Schmeiser put to rest any suggestion
that Monsanto et al. are not "possessors" in the sense intended by the doctrine
of cattle trespass; and Monsanto's own actions and the conditions under which
its products are distributed strengthen this contention further. The courts in-
Schmeiser took judicial notice of Monsanto's "determined efforts" to control its
genes, seeds, and plants, including protection from those "who were believed to
be growing Roundup Ready canola without authorization." 14.
We note that Monsanto-not its client farmers-took the responsibility to
round up and remove trespassing plants containing the patented genes, in
much the same way that the owners of livestock commonly collect their escaped
animals. Monsanto also required all farmers wishing to use its canola to enter
into a Technology Use Agreement (TUA) which bound the farmer to purchase
the seed only from a licensed distributor; to use the seed for only one
generation; to sell the crop to a purchaser licensed by Monsanto; to permit
Monsanto to inspect the fields of the contracting farmer and take samples to
verify compliance with the TUA; to inform Monsanto of the coordinates of all
cultivated RoundUp Ready canola; and to pay Monsanto a licensing fee of
fifteen dollars per acre. " '
Clearly, and contrary to Justice Smith's holding in Hoffinan, Monsanto
does exercise control over whether, where, and how its products are cultivated
and reproduced, substantially removing such control from its client farmers.
Indeed, the TUAs have been criticized as a form of serfdom wherein farmers
provide only labour, land, and license fees to a biotech demesne lord, who
oversees and derives the bulk of the benefit from the whole process. " ' Whether
or not this is the case, it is abundantly clear that Monsanto intends that its
113. De Beer, "Reconciling Property," supra note 52 at 11-13; Ziff, supra note 10.
114. Schmeiser FC, supra note 111 at para. 96.
115. See Nicole C. Nachtigal, "A Modern David and Goliath Farmer v. Monsanto: Advising a
Grower on the Monsanto Technology Agreement 2001," (2001-02) 6 Great Plains Nat.
Resources J. 50.
116. Muiller, supra note 7.
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transgenic products and their progeny, in their animate form, should remain
firmly under its control at every step of their lifespan. This offers golid
justification for assigning the company-rather than its client farmers-
ownership status for the purpose of tort liability in cattle trespass.
Earlier, we observed that an owner of an animal is presumed to have the
most relevant knowledge of the risks posed by his or her animal. For the most
part, courts in cattle trespass cases accept that a-possessor of livestock understands
the propensity of his or her animals to escape and do harm. With respect to
GMOs, the federal Plant Biosafety Office (PBO) requires that inventors and
fabricators of bioengineered organisms have as much or more knowledge of the
characteristics of their products than any rancher has of his or her livestock. In
seeking approval from the PBO, an applicant must provide extensive information
on the product's potential for genetic exchange with other species and with non-
.transgenic organisms of the same species. In the case of GT73 canola, the PBO
decision authorizing the release of Roundup Ready canola is clear that Monsanto
was aware that plants containing the gene have the ability to cross-pollinate with
conventional canola and possibly with other plants." 7"
CEPA also construes the manufacturers of animate products of
biotechnology to be the "owners" for the purpose of managing environmental
risks because they are in the best position to know the risks posed by their
products.118 The Act further states that manufacturers have an ongoing
obligation to provide new information to the Minister whenever the organism
is put to a "significant new activity" as defined by regulation.' While it is not
determinative here, this legislation clearly implies legal responsibilities for
biotech corporations as the owners and exploiters of bioengineered organisms
derived from their IP.
To summarize, the nature of the control exerted and the extent of legal
protection enjoyed by corporations like Monsanto over their biotech IP meet
the threshold of possession required for the tort of cattle trespass. The release of
117. Canadian Food Inspection Agency, Plant Health and Production Division, "Decision
Document DD95-02: Determination of Environmental Safety of Monsanto Canada Inc.'s
Roundup Herbicide-Tolerant Brassica napus Canola Line GT73" (2001), online:
<http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/plaveg/bioldd/dd9502e.shtml>.
118. CEPA, supra note 103 at s. 106(1)(a).
119. Ibid., ss. 106(3), (4).
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GMOs onto the market and into the environment is analogous to releasing a
herd of cattle into a fenced field. The owner in each instance is aware that the
creatures may break loose and cause damage of a predictable nature. Indeed,
releasing GMOs onto the market is more like turning cattle loose in a pasture
with broken fences: escape is inevitable. Owners can likewise determine the
costs of reducing the risk of that damage and weigh those costs against the
likelihood of having to compensate their neighbours for damages. To the extent
that risk reduction (deterrence) and/or reasonable compensation are achieved,
tort law may fulfill at least one of its traditional purposes of distributive justice.
D. WHY CATTLE TRESPASS?
There are a number of other reasons why cattle trespass is an appropriate action
for economic harms caused by GMO contamination. Some commentators have
suggested that negligence offers a less anachronistic approach, and a US court
in the StarLink litigation held that a claim in negligence may have merit.12
However, information campaigns like Monsanto's TUG may allow biotech
companies to raise a shield of due diligence, thereby deflecting liability for
transgenic drift to their client farmers. This approach fails to account for the
fact that GMOs, 'once released onto the market and widely cultivated, will
inevitably escape, regardless of the measures taken by client farmers. In
principle, the cattle trespass jurisprudence establishes that where a living
creature will, by its nature, inevitably escape and do damage, the owner is
strictly liable.
This tort would also rebalance the distribution of risk between IP owners,
who benefit from their monopoly over the plants containing their patented
gene, and those who may suffer harm from transgenic drift. Anyone who
creates a risk by keeping organisms should be liable when that risk ripens into
harm to his or her neighbours. Property rights are thus balanced by property
responsibilities, with the beneficial side effect (in the case of GMOs) of
increasing accountability for technological innovation."'
Other strategic advantages are also apparent. In certain cases, superficially
similar to Hoffman, where an intrusion appears to have occurred via natural
120. Marvin Kramer et al v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding Inc., et at., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828
(US Dist. Ct., N.D. I11. 2002) [Motion to Dismiss].
121. De Beer, "Rights and Responsibilities," supra note 6; Miuller, supra note 7.
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forces that are causally distant from the defendant's acts (such as oil, ash, or
pesticides carried to the plaintiffs land by wind or water), courts have
sometimes been unwilling to find trespass for lack of directness.1 22 Cattle
trespass emerged in part to address this issue, since the wandering of livestock
tends to occur according to the instincts of the animal, separate from, or in
spite of, the actions of its owners. Under this doctrine, the organism's
intervening agency is not a bar to recovery but rather the basis for liability.
Finally, one of the chief advantages of cattle trespass is that it relieves the
court from the politically charged task of placing the merits of GMOs
themselves on trial. As Kathryn Garforth has noted, given the uncertainty about
the dangers of GM foods and crops, the judiciary will be "very reluctant to
engage in a scientific rather than a legal exercise and [to] replace government
assessment of the canola varieties with its own.""'v' Under the doctrine of cattle
trespass, the plaintiff's burden is limited to showing on the balance of
probabilities that the offending organism is harmful because of its inbuilt
propensity to escape from the control of its owners and do scientifically
verifiable kinds of damage. By making such a finding, the court can justly
allocate, risk while avoiding highly politicized questions about the safety of
transgenic organisms, which can properly be left to the legislature.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND EQUIVOCATIONS
Reinvigorated, the doctrine of cattle trespass applies elegantly to a twenty-first
century problem. In Harrison v. Carswell, a case that likewise considered the
reinterpretation of longstanding rules of property and trespass to meet new
conditions, Justice Dickson (as he was then) wrote for the majority of the
Supreme Court:
The duty of the Court, as I envisage it, is to proceed in the discharge of its
adjudicative function in a reasoned way from principled decision and established
122. See Hoffman, supra note 2 at paras. 130-33. Southport Corporation v. Esso Petroleum Co.,
[1954] 2All E.R. 561 (C.A.); contra Kerr etal. v. Revelstoke Building Materials Ltd. (1976),
71 D.L.R. (3d) 134 (Alta S.C.).
123. Kathryn Garforth, "When Worlds Collide: Biotechnology Meets Organic Farming in
Hoffman v. Monsanto," Case Law Analysis, (2006) 18 J. Envtl. L. 459 at 469. Similarly, the
court is constrained by issues of justiciability and will generally decline to rule on issues that
are of a purely sociological, political, or hypothetical nature.
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concepts. I do not for a moment doubt the power of the Court to act creatively-it
has done so on countless occasions; but manifestly one must ask-what are the limits
of the judicial function? ... Holmes J. said in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen tcitation
omitted]: "I recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they
can do it only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular actions.
" 12
4
An extension of the common law doctrine of cattle trespass to
bioengineered organisms represents just such a creative yet principled and
interstitial approach. We are faced here with harm-economic loss caused by
GMO trespass-that mirrors the harms considered by fourteenth-century
English judges. Acting creatively with an eye toward fairness, judges moulded
the law of trespass to address the problem of escaping animals in ways that were
consonant with broader principles of tort law and distributive justice. In its
current form, the tort of cattle trespass stands ready to mitigate the harms
caused by new escaping creatures in a new millennium.
In concluding,* we concede that tort law is no panacea for this or any social
dilemma, and that this use of cattle trespass is limited in application. First, the
cause of action evolved from the need to manage relations between agrarian
neighbours on a relatively small scale and to provide redress when the actions
(or animals) of one neighbour trod upon the rights (or crops) of another. It
remains to be seen whether it can support the kind of David and Goliath
challenges exemplified by Hoffnan, or Goliath and Goliath contests like the
class action with respect to StarLink corn. Furthermore, there are indications in
the scientific literature that the global dispersal of-and investment in-
transgenic organisms has reached a critical mass, such that a few civil actions by
organic farmers will do little to prevent or reverse the environmental and
economic changes already well underway. Presented with this apparent
inexorability, courts may be hesitant to employ an uncommon though well
established doctrine to put the biotech genie back in its bottle.
It is also apparent that even widespread application of the proposed
doctrine cannot satisfactorily address the critical issues arising from the
increasing abilities of science and industry to manipulate the building blocks of
life and matter. Nothing short of a comprehensive and proactive legal, ethical,
and political approach can make the genie do our bidding in ways that
equitably distribute the risks and rewards of biotechnology. However, in view
124. Harrison v. Carswell, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 200 at 218.
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of the absence of such an approach, and the lack of protection for the property
rights and economic self-determination of individuals like the plaintiffs in
Hoffinan, there may be a role for tort law. The theory of tort law as
"ombudsman," put forward by A.M. Linden in 1973, suggests that in the hands
of "ordinary citizens," tort law can serve as "an instrument of social pressure
upon centres of governmental, financial and intellectual power."'
' 25
Enthusiastically supporting this perspective, Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad
assert that "[t] ort law, like sunlight, acts as a disinfectant by exposing hidden
threats to the public welfare."'26
This role is nowhere more apparent than in the Hoffiman case, which has
already spawned an international genre of academic and legal commentary and
advocacy. Governments have been forced to seriously consider and respond
(albeit mostly rhetorically) to the issues brought to light by the Hoffman
plaintiffs. Likewise, faced with adverse publicity and backlash, biotech
corporations have felt compelled to justify and modify their practices (albeit
mostly by seeking to further externalize their liability) and to explore
technological methods for mitigating the risks caused by their products. These
silver linings to the cloud of failure that overshadows the Hoffman case may yet
inspire other plaintiffs, perhaps under the banner of the doctrine of cattle
trespass, to come forward and seek a rebalancing of the rights and
responsibilities of the creators of transgenic organisms.
125. "Tort Law As Ombudsman" (1973) 51 Can. Bar Rev. 155 at 156.
126. Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, In Defence of Tort Law (New York: New York
University Press, 2002) at 3.

